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Abstract 
 
New  Web  2.0  applications,  with  their  emphasis  on 
collaboration and communication, hold the promise of 
major  advances  in  social  connectivity  and 
coordination; however, they also increase the threats 
to  user  privacy.  An  important,  yet  under-researched 
privacy risk results from social inferences about user 
identity,  location,  and  activities.  In  this  paper,  we 
frame the ‘social inference problem’. We then present 
the  results  from  a  292  subject  experiment  that 
highlights: 1) the prevalence of social inference risks; 
2) people’s difficulties in accurately predicting social 
inference  risks;  and  3)  the  relation  between 
information  entropy  and  social  inference.  We  also 
show  how  to  predict  possible  social  inferences  by 
modeling  users’  background  knowledge  and 
calculating information entropy and discuss how social 
inference support systems can be deployed that protect 
user privacy.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Considerable  advances  in  addressing  privacy 
threats  have  been  made  in  recent  years  in  terms  of 
computer  and  network  security  [29],  user  control 
mechanisms  [12],  privacy  policies,  and  ethical 
considerations  [17]. However,  changes  in  the 
technological environment are creating numerous new 
and unaddressed risks to user privacy. A key reason for 
this is the collaborative and often invasive nature of 
new  mobile  and  web  applications.  Such  applications 
can  give  users  the  ability  to  leverage  background 
knowledge  about  the  social  environment/context  to 
make unwanted inferences. 
The term inference as used in the privacy literature 
is the process of deducing unrevealed information as a 
consequence  of  being  presented  with  authorized 
information. A well known example of the inference 
problem  relates  to  an  organization’s  database  of 
employees [3], where the relation <Name, Salary> is a 
secret, but user u requests the following two queries: 
“List the RANK and SALARY of all employees” and 
“List the NAME and RANK of all employees.” None 
of the queries violates the security requirement because 
they do not contain the secured < NAME; SALARY > 
pair; however, since employees’ ranks appear in both 
pairs, the querier can use it to map employees’ names 
to  their  salaries  and  infer  their  salaries.  Inference  is 
mostly known as a security threat to databases [10] and 
sometimes  as  a  privacy  risk  in  data  mining  [25]. 
Although the inference problem as a threat to database 
confidentiality  is  discussed  in  many  studies,  mobile 
social  computing  raises  new  classes  of  more 
complicated  inferences  which  we  call  social 
inferences. Social inferences are inferences that result 
from  using  social  applications  and  are  about  user 
information associated with these applications such as 
identity,  location,  activities,  social  relations,  and 
profile  information.  Previous  inference  prevention 
methods  are  not  enough  to  address  social  inferences 
since in this domain:  
•  Users  are  able  to  learn  information  outside  the 
application (background knowledge) and use this 
information  as  a  premise  to  make  inferences. 
Therefore,  in  contrast  to  the  name-rank-salary 
example,  their  premises  are  not  limited  to  the 
information revealed by the application.  
•  Most  social  inferences  are  partial  inferences  not 
absolute inferences, i.e., they don’t logically result 
from  the  premises  as  in  the  name-rank-salary 
example, but they can be  guessed as a result of 
low information entropy; and 
•  The  sensitivity  of  user  information  may  have  a 
dynamic nature based on the context, such as time 
and location.  
While  numerous  social  computing  applications 
aim to address privacy concerns through access control 
[4,  12]  (e.g.,  Facebook  enables  users  to  set  privacy 
preferences),  direct  access  control  models  fail  to 
prevent unwanted inferences.  
In  this  paper,  we  analyze  the  social  inference 
problem in social computing systems theoretically and 
empirically. We present results of our study on subjects 
chatting  with  unknown  partners  and  use  our  study 
results  to  show  how  identity  inferences  happen  and 
what  comprises  users’  background  knowledge  that 
leads  to  identity  inferences.  We  will  also  show  that 
while  many  subjects  have  anonymity  concerns,  they 
are not able to realize what level of anonymity they are 
really  maintaining.  We  then  propose  prediction methods and solutions taking consideration that most 
inferences  in  social  computing  are  partial  inferences 
based on background knowledge.  
 
2.  Social  Computing  and  Privacy  Risks  
 
Social  computing  is  the  act  of  using  social 
software.  Social  software  describes  any  type  of 
software  that  connects  users  and  supports  social 
interaction and sharing data [21, 30]. A wide variety of 
social  applications  and  mobile  social  computing 
applications  exist;  email  and  instant  messaging  are 
simple ways of on-line communications. Many social 
applications  such  as  Facebook  and  Myspace  enable 
users to exchange messages, reveal their profile items, 
and find profile-based matches. Some of them such as 
LoveGety  leverage  location  and  mobility  to  provide 
innovative services [13].  
The use and sharing of geo-temporal (user location 
histories) and personal information raises many serious 
privacy concerns. Seven categories of potential privacy 
invasions  in  mobile  social  computing  systems  were 
introduced in a previous study [24]. They are: 
1. Inappropriate  use  by  Administrators:  For 
example, a system administrator may sell personal data 
without permission.  
2. Legal  Obligations:  For  example,  a  system 
administrator may be forced by an organization such as 
the police to reveal personal data. 
3. Inadequate Security: For example, the server is 
not  protected  against  intrusions  or  wireless 
transmission through the air is not secured. 
4. Lack  of  Control  over  Direct  Revelations 
(Poor  Features):    For  example,  a  cell  phone 
application that reveals my location to my friends, but 
does this without properly informing me or giving me 
control of this feature. 
5. Instantaneous Social Inferences: For example, 
when my cell phone shows that Bob is nearby and I 
can  only  see  two  people  with  a  similar  cell  phone 
around me. One of them must be Bob, thus increasing 
my chance of identifying him.  
6. Historical Social Inferences through persistent 
user  observation.  For  example,  two  nicknames  are 
repeatedly shown on the first floor of the gym where 
the gym assistant normally sits. One of them must be 
the gym assistant. 
7. Social  Leveraging  of  Privileged  Data:  For 
example, David can't access my location, but Jane can. 
David asks Jane my location. 
Social  inferences  include  the  fifth  and  sixth 
category. They are inferences about user information 
associated  with  mobile  social  applications  such  as 
identity,  location,  activities,  social  relations,  and 
profile information.  
Based on information theory, as we collect more 
information  about  a  user,  such  as  his/her  contextual 
situation, our uncertainty about other aspects such as 
his/her  identity  may  be  reduced,  thus  increasing  our 
probability  of  correctly  guessing  these  aspects.  This 
uncertainty  is  measured  by  information  entropy  in 
information theory. As we will see, this entropy also 
depends  on  the  number  of  entities  (e.g.,  users)  that 
match our collected information. Collected information 
includes  not  only  the  information  that  our  system 
provides to users, but the information available outside 
of  database  or  background  knowledge.  Therefore, 
social  inferences  happen  when  collected  information 
reduces the inferrer’s uncertainty about an attribute to a 
level  that  she/he  could  deduce  that  attribute’s  value. 
The social inference problem can include a wide range 
of  issues.  However,  any  inference  that  results  from 
using  social  applications  can  be  made  in  one  of  the 
following  two  ways:  1)  the  inferrer  uses  only  the 
current state of the system. This type of inference is 
based  only  on  the  current  observation  of  the  system 
and  is  called  instantaneous  inference  (our  fifth 
category) or, 2) the inferrer uses the history of her/his 
observations (or the history of the answers to previous 
queries), which is called historical inference.  
Based on the nature of mobile social applications, 
social  inferences  are  either  the  result  of  accessing 
location-based  information  or  the  result  of  social 
communications,  or  both.  We  call  the  first  type, 
location-related  inferences  and  the  second  type 
inferences in computer-mediated communications. The 
following  three  scenarios  illustrate  this  point:  1) 
Instantaneous  social  inferences  in  online 
communications - Cathy chooses a nickname for her 
profile and hides her real name, but her profile shows 
that she is a female football player. Since there are only 
a few female football players at my school, there is a 
high chance that I can identify her; 2) Instantaneous 
location-related  social  inferences  -  My  cell  phone 
shows few nicknames in a room and I know (or I find 
out  from  the  school’s  website)  that  the  room  is 
Professor  Smith’s  office.  Therefore,  there  is  a  high 
probability that Prof. Smith is in his office and one of 
those  few  nicknames  belongs  to  him;  3)  Historical 
location-related inferences – Two users identified as 
Superman2 and Prof. Johnson are repeatedly shown in 
a room, which I know is Prof. Johnson’s office. I also 
know  (or  I  find  out  from  the  school’s  website)  that 
David  is  his  PhD  student.  Therefore,  Superman2  is 
probably David and he is currently at Prof. Johnson’s 
office. 3.0  Instantiated  Privacy  Management 
Solutions  
 
Extensive research focuses on helping computer users 
protect  their  privacy.  Researchers  have  looked  at 
various aspects of privacy enhancement such as ethics 
of  information  management,  system  features,  access 
control  systems,  and  security  and  database 
confidentiality protection. We classify their effort into 
four sections as discussed below. 
1.  Ethics,  principles,  and  rules:  To  properly 
respond  to  concerns  of  ethics  and  principles,  and  to 
protect the user privacy, researchers have made various 
suggestions.  In  particular,  Langheinrich  [17]  defines 
the principles of fair information practices as openness 
and  transparency,  individual  participation,  collection 
limitation,  data  quality,  use  limitation,  reasonable 
security, accountability, and explicit consent. He then 
sets principles for privacy in mobile computing, that 
consist  of  notice,  choice,  proximity,  anonymity, 
security, and access.  
2.  Access  control  systems:    Access  control 
systems provide the user with an interface to set their 
privacy  preferences.  They  directly  control  people’s 
access to the user’s information based on his privacy 
settings.  Access control systems  with an  interface to 
protect  user  privacy  started  with  internetworking. 
Later, they were extended to context-aware and then 
ubiquitous  computing.  The  earliest  work  within  this 
area is  P3P [5]. P3P enables users to regulate their 
settings  based  on  different  factors  including 
consequence,  data-type,  retention,  purpose,  and 
recipient.  Ackerman  [1]  implemented  critic-based 
agents, called  Privacy Critics, for online interactions. 
These  agents  watch  the  user's  actions  and  make 
appropriate  privacy  suggestions.  Access  control 
mechanisms for mobile and location-aware computing 
were introduced later [12, 15, 18, 27]. 
3.  Security  protection:  Security  protection 
handles the following aspects: 
•  Availability  (services  are  available  to  authorized 
users). 
•  Integrity (free from unauthorized manipulation). 
•  Confidentiality  (only  the  intended  user  receives 
the information). 
•  Accountability (actions of an entity must be traced 
uniquely). 
•  Assurance (assure that the security measures have 
been properly implemented). 
The  inference  problem  is  mostly  known  as  a 
security  problem  that  targets  system-based 
confidentiality.  Confidentiality  protection  is  the  area 
that  includes  most  of  the  previous  research  on  the 
inference  problem.  Therefore,  suggested  solutions 
often deal with secure database design. There are also 
methods  that  evaluate  the  queries  to  predict  any 
inference risks. Both methods are explained in the next 
section. 
4.  Inference  management:  Two  different 
techniques have been proposed to identify and remove 
inference  channels.  One  makes  use  of  semantic  data 
modeling methods to locate inference channels in the 
database design and then to redesign the database to 
remove these channels. The other technique evaluates 
database  queries  to  understand  whether  they  lead  to 
unauthorized  inferences.  Each  technique  has  its 
drawbacks, the former is vulnerable to false positives 
and negatives and denial of service attacks. The latter 
usually  has  a  high  computational  complexity. 
Additionally, a dynamic social environment limits the 
usability of such systems because they can restrictively 
limit a user’s access to information. Both techniques 
have  been  studied  for  statistical  databases  [19], 
multilevel  secure  databases    [14,  28],  and  general 
purpose databases [3, 7]. A few researchers have also 
addressed this problem via data mining [26]. Since in 
the  domain  of  mobile  social  computing  user 
information  and  preferences  are  dynamic,  the  first 
technique cannot be used in such systems. 
Denning and Morgenstern, pioneers in calculating 
the  partial  inference  risk,  employed  classical 
information theory to measure the inference chance [8, 
23]. Given two data items x and y, let H(y) denote the 
entropy of y and  ( )
x H y  denote the entropy of y given 
x, where entropy is as defined in information theory. 
Then,  the  reduction  in  uncertainty  of  y  given  x  is 
defined as follows: 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
x H y H y
Infer x y
H y
−
→ =  
The  value  of  Infer  (x￿  y)  is  between  0  and  1, 
representing how likely it is to derive y given x. If the 
value is 1, then y can be definitely inferred given x. 
Denning  and  Morgenstern  did  not  know  how  to  use 
this formulation in real situations and they mention the 
serious drawbacks of using this technique [8], Firstly, 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the value 
of ( )
x H y ; secondly, the computational complexity that 
is required to draw the inference is ignored [8]. 
Nevertheless,  this  formulation  has  the  advantage 
of presenting the probabilistic nature of inference (i.e., 
inference is a relative not an absolute concept). 
Although the inference problem includes a  wide 
range of issues, studies and polls suggest that identity 
is the most sensitive piece of users’ information [24] 
and anonymity preservation is an important aspect of 
application designs and research [11, 16]. Anonymity 
is  defined  as  “not  having  identifying  characteristics such as a name or description of physical appearance 
disclosed so that the participants remain unidentifiable 
to anyone outside the permitted people promised at the 
time of informed consent” [9]. Recently, new measures 
of  privacy  called  k-anonymity  and  L-diversity  have 
gained popularity [20, 30]. k-anonymity is suggested to 
manage  identity  inference,  while  L-diversity  is 
suggested  to  protect  both  identity  inference  and 
attribute  inference  in  databases.  In  a  k-anonymized 
dataset, each record is indistinguishable from at least 
k−1 other records with respect to certain “identifying” 
attributes. These techniques can be broadly classified 
into  generalization  techniques,  generalization  with 
tuple suppression techniques, and data swapping and 
randomization techniques. Nevertheless, k-anonymized 
datasets  are  vulnerable  to  many  inference  attacks 
including  attacks  based  on  background  knowledge. 
Identity  inferences  in  next  generation  mobile  social 
computing systems cannot be addressed by the above 
techniques because:  
•  The sensitivity of user information is dynamic in 
nature  based  on  the  context,  such  as  time  and 
location.  
•  Information  such  as  life  patterns,  physical 
characteristics, and the quality of social relations 
that are not kept in the database can be inferred 
from information available to the user. Therefore, 
inferences  in  such  systems  are  not  limited  to 
attribute disclosures.  
•  Users’  background  knowledge  (the  information 
users learn outside the database) is a premise in 
many inferences.  
We  will  demonstrate  how  by  assuming  an  ideal 
perfect model of the background knowledge in mobile 
social computing systems and focusing on anonymity 
protection, our modeling and use of inference chance 
based on information entropy can sometimes simplify 
into a dynamic k-anonymity problem. 
 
4. Aims and Research Questions  
 
An important role of social applications is to help 
users  enhance  their  social  network  and  make  new 
social ties. Social networking sites such as Facebook 
and Orkut allow you to view users’ profile information 
based  on  their  privacy  settings  and  to  exchange 
messages. A popular way of making new social ties is 
social  matching  [31].  For  example,  friend-of-friend 
systems provide users access to various parts of their 
friends’  profiles  [2].  In  existing  social  matching 
systems  such  as  OKCupid  and  Orkut  users  usually 
utilize  a  combination  of  synchronous  and 
asynchronous private messages, profile comments, and 
friend  requests  to  move  the  introduction  forward. 
While messaging and exchanging profile items help the 
introduction process, revealing profile items during this 
introduction increases the chance of social inferences 
and  in  particular  identity  inference,  which  lead  to 
anonymity violation. We were interested in answering 
the following questions regarding the social inference 
risks associated with social computing applications: 
•  How  and  how  often  do  users  make  social 
inferences?  
•  What are the best predictors of the chances of a 
social inference?  
•  What is the impact of conversation parameters and 
user interface on the chance of a social inference? 
•  What level of anonymity is desired by the users 
and are they able to reach that? 
•  What  background  knowledge  do  individuals 
routinely use to make social inferences?  
As  a  first  step  in  addressing  these  questions  we 
conducted  a  user  experiment  exploring  identity 
inferences  in  computer-mediated  communication 
between unknown chat partners.  
 
5. Method 
 
5.1. Subjects 
 
All subjects were recruited through desks situated 
in  the  campus  center  of  a  medium  sized  urban 
university  with  the  offer  of  $20  for:  1)  entering  a 
personal profile online; 2) participating in a short chat 
experiment;  followed  by  3)  completing  a  short  post 
chat  survey.  Five  hundred  and  thirty  students 
completed the profile entry portion, 304 participated in 
the chat session of which 292 subjects completed all 
three  study  components.  Subjects  were  exclusively 
university students representative of the various majors 
offered on campus and ranging  from 18 to 57 years 
old. Twenty three percent of the subjects were female, 
and 66% of the subjects were commuters (living off 
campus).  
 
5.2.  Procedure 
 
Phase I – Online Profile Entry – The online profile 
consisted  of  67  individual  profile  fields  (items), 
clustered  into  5  broad  categories  (basic  information, 
personal  information,  education  information,  contact 
information,  and  interests).  Completing  the  profile 
entry  web  page  took  subjects  approximately  10 
minutes.  
Phase  II  –  Chat  Experiment  –  Subjects  that 
completed the profile entry were able to select various 
time slots to participate in the chat experiment. These subjects were then randomly assigned to one of four 
experimental  conditions  (described  below) 
differentiated by the introduction mechanism used.  
Phase III – Post Chat Survey – After completing 
the  chat  session  subjects  answered  a  survey  which 
asked about their chat partner, the level of anonymity 
they had desired and achieved at the end of the chat 
session and their willingness/desire to meet their chat 
partner.   
 
5.3.  Introduction Mechanism 
 
 Participants  used  a  custom-developed  software 
application  designed  to  aid  in  communication  and 
exchange  of  personal  profile  information.  The 
application was exclusively intended for use in a larger 
study on strangers’ communication, of which the study 
described in this paper, was a part.  
After  both  participants  authenticate,  each 
participant sees his/her own profile on the left side of 
the  screen,  a  chat  box  for  typing  in  the  center,  and 
his/her chat partner’s profile (all information hidden by 
default) on the right side, and action buttons (e.g., end 
chat, etc.) at the center bottom.  
By  default,  a  participant’s  profile  information  is 
completely hidden from her/his partner and vice versa. 
To reveal a field in her/his profile to her/his partner, 
the participant simply clicks on the desired field. When 
a participant reveals a field, it appears on the right side 
of her/his partner’s screen next to the appropriate field 
in  a  yellow  highlight  on  both  screens.  Similarly,  a 
participant can request parts of his/her partner’s profile 
by  clicking  on  the  item  which  makes  it  appear  in  a 
green  highlight.  Participants  also  have  the  option  of 
requesting and revealing whole sections of a profile by 
clicking on each of 5 broad category labels. 
Depending  on  the  condition,  participants  could 
perform 16 actions such as reveal, request, chat, or use 
the action buttons.  
 
5.4.  Experimental Conditions 
 
Condition 1 – Chat Only (75 subjects) - In this 
condition, profiles are disabled and although subjects 
can see their own profile on the left side of the screen, 
they cannot reveal and request profile items. They can 
only chat by typing in the chat box. 
Condition 2 – Introduction Mechanism only (72 
subjects)  -  In  this  condition,  participants  could  only 
click on profile fields to reveal or request them, but 
could not type in the chat box and use it for a regular 
chat.  
Conditions 3 (63 subjects) and 4 (82 subjects) - 
Chat  and  Introduction  Mechanism  -  Conditions  3 
and 4 enabled participants to use both profiles and the 
simple typing mechanism of the chat box. They could 
reveal their previously entered profile information by 
clicking on it or typing it, they also had the option of 
general text based chat where it was possible for them 
to  reveal  any  kind  of  information.  In  condition  3, 
revealed  profile  fields  of  a  subject’s  partner  would 
disappear from the subject screen after 5 seconds and 
to see it again, the subject had to click on it, or scroll 
the middle box up to find it. However, in condition 4, 
revealed information stayed visible until the end of the 
session.  
 
5.5.  Post Experimental Chat Survey  
 
Following  questions  related  to  social  inferences 
were asked in the post chat survey. 
1. Without  your  chat  partner  revealing  her/his 
complete name, do you think you could work out your 
partner  (such  as  guess  his  name  or  remember  his 
physical appearance)?  
o I am able to guess exactly who my partner is 
now, although s/he didn't introduce.  
o I was able to guess exactly who my partner was 
during the chat and I was right. 
o I  guessed  exactly  who  my  partner  was  during 
the chat, but I was wrong. 
o I  was/am  able  to  guess  that  I  had  seen  my 
partner  before,  but  I  only  knew  her/his  physical 
appearance. 
o I was/am able to narrow my partner down to a 
few  possible  individuals  before  a  complete 
introduction, but I didn't know exactly who s/he was. 
(If you're able to narrow her/him down to a few people, 
how many people would that be?) 
2. Please elaborate on the details you deduced or 
guessed  about  her/his  identity  without  your  partner 
revealing  it.  If  you  guessed  some  possible  names, 
please mention the names or if you think you have seen 
her/ him, elaborate on her/his physical characteristics 
such as height, weight, facial features, etc.   
3. How  did  you  make  the  above  guesses  on  the 
person’s identity? What knowledge did you use to do 
this? 
4. After this conversation, given enough time and 
other information sources available to you, how well 
do you think you can identify your chat partner? 
5. Please mention all the information sources you 
may use to do so. 
6. How anonymous did you want to be to your chat 
partner before you decided to introduce yourself?  
7. What does your partner know about you? 
In  questions  4,  6,  and  7,  subjects  were  given 
options similar to question 1.  
  5.6. Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
In addition to answers directly collected from the 
survey, the  following parameters  were calculated for 
each subject:  
• Duration of the introduction phase (chat); 
• Software condition used; 
• Number of profile items revealed; 
• Profile items revealed in the conversations. All 
information revealed was coded into the field number. 
Fields  revealed  by  using  the  mechanism  were 
automatically coded and typed information was hand 
coded. 
• Name-revelation:  defined  as  1  if  the  complete 
name was revealed; 
• Immediate-introduction:  defined  as  1  if 
complete name was the first thing to be revealed; 
• Maintained degree of anonymity: the number of 
people  to  who  the  subject’s  partner  could  correctly 
narrow  him  down.  For  example,  if  subject  A  can 
correctly  narrow  subject  B  down  to  2  individuals, 
subject B’s maintained degree of anonymity will be 2; 
• Desired  degree  of  anonymity:  indicates  what 
degree of anonymity a subject wished to maintain. For 
example,  if  subject  B  does  not  want  to  be  exactly 
identified, her desired degree of anonymity will be 2; 
• Perceived  degree  of  anonymity:  shows  what 
degree  of  anonymity  the  subject  thought  he 
maintained; 
• Estimated  degree  of  anonymity:  A  measure  of 
information  entropy,  which  shows  our  estimation  of 
what degree of anonymity a subject really maintained 
based  on  what  they  revealed.  We  estimated  this 
variable  based  on  profiles  of  530  students  that 
registered for the study.  Details of calculation will be 
explained in section 7.2; and 
• Identity  inference  incidents:  to  model  the 
inference risk, we defined this variable, which was set 
to 1 if subjects could narrow their partner down to less 
than 50 people. 
 
6. Results 
 
6.1. Identity Inferences 
 
Eighty  percent  of  the  subjects  said  they  had  no 
idea  who  their  partners  were  before  a  complete 
introduction.  Among  the  20%  who  said  they  could 
guess  something,  55%  were  correct  (11%  of  total 
subjects) and the rest were wrong or not clear enough 
about  what  they  inferred.  In  addition,  8.5%  of  the 
subjects guessed exactly their partner’s identity. Fifty-
six percent of the subjects said that having access to 
information sources, they could at least narrow their 
partner down to a few individuals.  
As  expected,  all  inferences  happened  when  a 
subject’s  revealed  information  combined  with  their 
partner’s  background  knowledge  resulted  in  low 
information  entropy  which  led  to  uniqueness  of 
revealed information. For example, a subject revealed 
her  gender,  ethnicity,  and  group  memberships  to  be 
female,  Hispanic,  and  soccer  team  member, 
respectively. Her partner, who had seen the women’s 
soccer team playing, knew there was only one Hispanic 
player on the team and was able to infer who she was. 
Other  examples  included  revelation  of  gender, 
ethnicity,  and  courses  taken  (white  girl  attended  a 
chemistry  class),  ethnicity  and  occupation  (Indian 
resident assistant in the dormitories), etc. 
 
6.2. Predictor of the Identity Inference  
 
A  binary  stepwise  Logistic  Regression  test  was 
performed  on  the  identity-inference-incident 
(dependent  variable)  and  the  independent  variables 
duration, condition, number of revealed items, name-
revelation, immediate-introduction, desired-degree-of-
anonymity,  perceived  degree  of  anonymity,  and 
estimated degree of anonymity. Only estimated degree 
of anonymity showed  was a  reliable predictor of the 
identity  inference  incident  (Wald  χ
2=55.1,  degree  of 
freedom:  df=8,  p=0.016).  This  suggests  that  our 
estimated  degree  of  anonymity  is  the  only  strong 
predictor of social inference incidents. 
As we will see in section 7.2, in a simplistic case, 
identity entropy of person B in this study is determined 
by  estimated  degree  of  anonymity.  Therefore,  our 
estimation  of  information  entropy  was  the  best 
predictor of the chances of a correct social inference.  
 
6.3. The Impact of Conversation Features 
 
Although more inferences were made in condition 
1  (chat-only)  than  in  condition  2  (introduction 
mechanism-only),  no  significant  statistical  difference 
was  found  between  experimental  conditions.  Users 
reveal many more profile fields in condition 2 and less 
in condition 1 (the mean number of items revealed was 
4.39 for condition 1 and 31.58 for condition 2). This is 
probably  because  profile  exchange  and  profile 
revelation  requests  are  the  only  actions  possible  in 
condition  2.  However,  as  we  saw  in  section  6.2, 
revealing  more  profile  items  is  not  necessarily 
equivalent  to  maintaining  less  entropy  and  revealing 
more identifiers. A Spearman correlation test shows a 
small correlation between the number of revealed items 
and  our  estimated  degree  of  anonymity  (n=288, 
Spearman  rho=0.21,  p=0.005).  There  was  no significant correlation between the maintained degree 
of  anonymity  and  number  of  revealed  items  (n=288, 
Spearman’s rho =0.018, p=0.76).  
 
6.4.  Subjects’  Ability  to  Maintain  Their 
Desired Degree of Anonymity 
 
The level of anonymity desired varied greatly, 72% of 
the subjects who had anonymity concerns did not want 
to be exactly identified by their name or face, 6.3% of 
them did not want to be narrowed down to two people 
or  less  and  the  rest  desired  a  higher  degree  of 
anonymity.  
Although  perceived  degree  of  anonymity  for  a 
subject and maintained degree of anonymity for their 
partner  had  a  small  correlation  (n=254,  Spearman’s 
rho=0.155, p=0.031), they were equal only 48% of the 
time. This means 52% of participants could not guess 
what their partner knew about their identity.  Spearman 
correlation  test  showed  a  small  correlation  between 
estimated degree of anonymity and maintained degree 
of anonymity. However, estimated degree of anonymity 
was smaller than maintained degree of anonymity for 
20% of the subjects, which means 20% of the subjects 
revealed  identifiers  that  put  them  at  the  risk  of 
unwanted  identity  inference.  Fifteen  percent  of  the 
subjects  wished  to  be  anonymous  even  though  they 
revealed their full name during the conversation. 
 
6.5. Sources of Background Knowledge 
 
During their chats subjects did not have access to 
search  tools,  personal  profiles,  or  other  information 
sources.  Hence,  they  only  inferred  their  partners’ 
identities if revealed information helped them realize 
that  they  had  seen  their  partner  before  or  if  they 
already  had enough knowledge to be able to narrow 
their partner down to a few people.  
When  subjects  were  asked  to  mention  the 
information  sources  they  would  use,  they  mentioned 
sites that include personal profiles such as Facebook, 
Myspace,  and  Orkut.  Other  sources  included  the 
university directory and website, Yahoo and AIM to 
search email addresses, and phone directories to search 
for phone numbers.  
We also noticed that subjects tend to guess their 
partners’  gender  and  home  country  from  their  “chat 
style”.  Subjects’  responses  show  that  the  chat  style 
includes the  way someone answers a question, slang 
and abbreviations they use, and their English language 
fluency. When participants where asked to elaborate on 
details they guessed about their partner’s identity, 11% 
percent of them guessed their partners’ gender and 6% 
guessed  their  partners’  country/region.  They  were 
correct around 94% of the time about gender and 87% 
of the time about home country. This result suggests 
that  gender  and  region  are  two  types  of  probable 
background  information  with  probabilities  of  10.4% 
and 5.2% respectively.  
7.  Social  Inference  Prediction  and 
Theoretic Frame 
 
The results of our study suggest the need for an 
inference control system in social computing. We saw 
that  social  inferences  happen  as  a  result  of  low 
information entropy.  An inferrer usually reaches this 
low entropy by combining the information he receives 
from  the  application  combined  with  his  background 
knowledge.  
Cuppons  and  Trouessin  [6]  formulate  inference 
control as follows;  
If  A  is  permitted  to  know  Q  and  A  can  do  the 
derivation  (Q=>Φ),  then  A  should  be  permitted  to 
know Φ. Consequently, if we wantΦto be forbidden 
for  A  andΦcan  be  inferred  from  Q,  Q  should  be 
forbidden for A as well. 
To understand what determines Q => Φ, we need 
to  remember  that  considering  partial  inferences  in  a 
mobile  social  computing  system,Φmay  not  be 
logically deduced from Q as indicated by Q => Φ, but, 
as Morgenstern mentions, Φ may belong to the Sphere 
Of Influence of Q ( ( ) SOI Q ) [23]. We define that in a 
mobile  social  computing  system,  Φ  belongs  to  the 
Sphere Of Influence of Q ( ( ) SOI Q Φ∈ ) if knowing Q 
reduces  the  uncertainty  about  Φ  enough  to  make  an 
inference.  Accordingly,  we  modify  Cuppons’ 
formulation  as  follows:  We  define  Q  to  be  the 
information  included  in  the  query,  its  answer,  and 
background  knowledge  that  is  modeled  as  described 
below.  Q  is  safe  to  be  completely  known  by  A  if 
, [( ( ) ( )) ( )] A A SOI Q PK Q PK ∀Φ Φ∈ ∧ ⇒ Φ ,  which  means 
A is permitted to know Q only if he is permitted to 
know everything in its Sphere Of Influence).  
 
7.1. Modeling Background Knowledge 
Most  previous  inference  control  frameworks  are 
vulnerable to attacks based on background knowledge. 
Background knowledge is the information available to 
users outside the database. This information should be 
assumed to be known by all the users just like answers 
to  their  queries  are  assumed  to  be  known  by  them. 
Thuraisingham  [32]  points  out  that  to  preserve 
database integrity, sometimes we need to model user 
knowledge  in  the  outside  world.  As  Jajodia  and 
Midows  [14]  say,  “We  have  no  way  of  controlling 
what data is learned outside of the database, and our 
abilities to predict it  will be limited. Thus, even the best model can give us only an approximate idea of 
how safe a database is from illegal inferences”.  
The results of our user study suggest that subjects 
not  only  use  searching  profiles  and  the  campus 
directory  (which  is  an  organization’s  website)  to 
identify their chat partner, but also tend to guess their 
partner’s  gender  and  home  country  from  what  they 
usually  term  as  their  “chat  style”.  We  categorize 
background  information  associated  with  computer-
mediated communication as follows: the organization’s 
website  and  public  information,  personal  profiles, 
phone  and  address  directories,  gender,  and  home 
country 
In the examples illustrated in section 2, we showed 
how in a location-aware system there exist meanings 
and  implications  associated  with  location,  such  as 
visual  information  of  nearby  people,  ownership, 
common  usage,  and  purpose  of  places,  etc.  That 
indicates  background  knowledge  associated  with 
location  which  includes  the  official  manager  of  the 
place and people related to her/him, official use and 
schedule  of  the  place,  and  visual  information  of  the 
inferrer’s vicinity. 
Having all the information modeled in Q., we can 
estimate SOI(Q).   
 
7.2. Calculating the Entropy for Instantaneous 
Inferences (Category 5) 
As mentioned in Section 3, Morgenstern [8, 22] 
formulated for the first time partial inferences based on 
the entropy of information, but he didn’t know how to 
calculate  it  in  the  general  sense.  We  modified  his 
formulation  for  social  computing  applications  to 
calculate the instantaneous inference risk.  
We want to calculate the risk that an attribute Φ is 
inferred from revealed information, Q. We define the 
inference function as follows: 
max
max
-
1 ( )  
c H H
INF Q
H
→ Φ =  ,       (1) 
where  Hmax  represents  the  maximum  information 
entropy for the environment and is fixed for any given 
application;  Hc  is  the  information  entropy  under  the 
current  conditions  and  is  dynamic  based  on  the 
situation. Hmax is calculated as follows: 
max 2
1
.log
X
H P P = −∑  ,                (2) 
where P=1/X and X is the maximum number of entities 
(users) related to the application. 
c H  is calculated as 
follows: 
2
1
1( ).log 1( )
V
c
i
H P i P i
=
= −∑ ,          (3) 
where  V  is  the  number  of  possible  values  for  
attributeΦ. P1(i) is the probability that the i
th possible 
value is thought to be the correct one by the inferrer. If 
the inferrer didn’t know the collected information, Q, 
Φ could be any of the possible values with the prior 
probability of 1/ X. This results in maximum entropy, 
Hmax. However, after having access to Q, P1(i) is the 
posterior probability of each value and equals P given 
Q.  When  INF1  is  too  high,  say  larger  than  C,  an 
appropriate action needs to be taken. The appropriate 
action can be rejecting the query, blurring the answer, 
or sending a warning to the owner of the information.  
We  will  provide  further  examples  to  explain  this 
model. 
For example to calculate the identity inference risk 
of user A in an on-line communication similar to our 
above study: 
Q: (profile items matching A’s profile items that are 
already revealed). 
1 Φ : Partner’s identity at name or face granularity. 
X:  total number of potential users of the application. 
V: number of users that satisfy Q. 
 
We define: 
Group F: users that are the same sex as A and satisfy 
Q. 
Group  G:  users  that  come  from  the  same 
country/region as A and satisfy Q. 
X1: number of users in group F. 
X2: number of users in group G. 
X3:  number  of  users  in  the  intersection  of  F  and  G 
(F∩G). 
ς:  probability of guessing the right gender from the 
partner’s chat style (which was shown to be 10.4% in 
our user study). 
σ: probability of guessing the right home country from 
the partner’s chat style (which was shown to be 5.2% 
in our user study). 
•  If users use their guesses on gender and home 
country as their background knowledge:  
. / 3+  .(1- )/( 1)+(1 ). /( 2)   for F G
.(1- )/( 1)+(1 ).(1- )/              for F-F G
1
(1 ). /( 2)+(1 ).(1- )/           for G-F G
(1 ).(1- )/V                         for the rest of users
X X X
X V
P
X V
ς σ ς σ ς σ
ς σ ς σ
ς σ ς σ
ς σ
− 
−
= − −
−
I
I
I



 
(4) 
This means that users of the same gender and 
ethnicity (F∩G) have the highest probability and 
the users, who don’t fall in F or G have the 
lowest probability. 
•  If there are no guesses involved and background 
knowledge  only  includes  deterministic 
information (which is publicly available) 
P1=1/V            (5) 
In the second case, according to equations 6 and 3, 
Hc  equals  Σ(1/V).log(1/V).  Therefore,  if  we  assume that  all  the  information  available  to  the  users  is 
deterministic (which means if they are able to access 
the information source, they are either able to know the 
exact answer or not) and assume that all information 
available outside the database is included in Q, for any 
given application and known condition, INF1 is only 
determined  by  the  number  of  users  satisfying  that 
condition  (V).  That  is  how  we  calculated  estimated 
degree of anonymity in section 6 (number of users who 
share the same revealed profile items). We used it to 
perform the regression test in our user study and we 
saw that estimated degree of anonymity was the only 
strong predictor of the inference chance.  
Furthermore, to have an INF1 value smaller than 
the associated threshold in the second case, at least U 
indistinguishable users are needed in the situation. This 
satisfies k-anonymity with k=U. However, our entropy 
control method is more general than the k-anonymity 
solution.  In  particular,  it  can  model  a  probabilistic 
model of background knowledge, such as guesses on 
gender  and  home  country.  It  can  also  be  used  to 
calculate the risk of inferring other attributes such as 
location.  
7.3. Calculation of Entropy for Historical 
Inferences (Category 6).  
Our  model  in  the  previous  category  applies  here  as 
well, but in this category Q also includes answers to 
past queries. The inference chance will be calculated 
from an inference formula similar to (1), as described 
below. 
max max
max max
max
max
,
2( )
,
i i
i
i
H H H H
if C
H H
INF Q
H H
if C
H
λ
− −   <     →Φ =  −   ≥
   
 (6) 
where 
max 2
1
.log
Y
H P P = −∑ .  ( max H is  again  fixed  for  each 
application.) 
λ = number of queries that involve the attribute and 
were sent after 
max max ( )/ i H H H −  reached the threshold 
value C.  
V
1
1( ).log 1( ) i H P i P i = −∑ , 
where P1 is the probability that a value is thought to be 
the  correct  attribute  value  by  the  inferrer.  V  is  the 
number of possible values repeated in previous queries 
starting at the current time and going back an amount 
of time equal to T(given). 
In  this  formulation,  INFi2  also  considers  the 
history of the queries. Unlike INF1, INFi2 is calculated 
for  any  time  slot  i.  INFi2  is  between  0  and  1  until 
(Hmax-Hi)/ Hmax reaches the threshold value C. When 
INFi2 equals C, entropy of Φ is too low and sending 
multiple queries involvingΦcan lead to an inference. 
Therefore, at this time INFi2 starts counting the new 
queries. After INFi2 passes a number of queries, say K, 
the system takes an appropriate action such as dynamic 
blurring. We consider discrete finite duration T for past 
queries  since  humans  don’t  have  a  perfect  memory. 
Thus,  we  assume  they  forget  the  answers  to  queries 
sent more than T time units ago. However, to protect 
the  system  against  inference  attacks,  the  calculation 
and results can be extended for T￿∞. Obviously, if 
time slots i and j overlap, rejecting a query based on 
INFi2 affects the value of INFi2. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
This  article  highlights  the  significant  privacy 
threats  associated  with  the  use  of  social  software 
resulting  from  social  inference.  The  nature  of  this 
‘social  inference  problem’  was  illustrated  through  a 
292 subject experiment, which showed that: 
•  Identity inferences are frequently made in on-line 
communication;  
•  Different  users  desire  different  levels  of 
anonymity; 
•  Even  when  users  are  in  complete  control  of  the 
information  they  reveal,  they  are  not  able  to 
maintain their desired degree of anonymity. This is 
because individuals are unable to correctly judge 
inference risks; and  
•  Information entropy, calculated by construction of 
an idealized model of background knowledge, was 
the only measure found to strongly predict identity 
inference; 
These results validate our methods for calculating 
information entropy. They also highlight the need for 
social  inference  protection  systems.  Such  protection 
systems could improve user inference-risk judgments 
through  techniques,  such  as  risk  visualizations  or 
warning  messages.  Alternatively  inference  protection 
systems  could  modify  information  exchange,  for 
example,  by  lowering  the  granularity  of  revealed 
information. 
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